India and the US: Towards A New Partnership
US President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Namaste Trump rally February 2020.
Over the past decade. The US and India have moved towards a strategic, yet unofficial, alliance. Since the arrival of President Trump in the Oval Office, the focus of him and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been directed to a single objective in the Indo-Pacific region, the containment of a rising China. With just the Himalayas dividing the two nations, China is the biggest economic and military rival of India in the region. The desire to contain China has brought Washington and New Delhi close together. Yet, there have been recent trade disputes between the two states. The Trump administration terminated India’s ‘Special State Status’ and India retaliated by increasing tariffs on twenty-eight US products as a response to the US duties imposed on steel and aluminum in 2018. But despite these hiccups, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi have engaged in a highly visible diplomatic courtship that is partially motivated by domestic political considerations. Modi’s ‘Howdy Modi’ event at the NRG Stadium, Houston, Texas on 22 September 2019 provided a platform for Trump to reach out to the Indian diaspora who had been previously swayed towards the Democrats. It also presented the global audience with the narrative that everything is ‘fine’ in India despite the nationwide anti-government protest on the new Citizenship Amendment Act.
In response, President Trump chose Modi’s home state of Gujarat as his setting for his first Presidential visit to India- The ‘Namaste (hello) Trump’ event was held in the largest cricket stadium in the world Sardar Patel Stadium, Ahmedabad, Gujarat and was attended by almost 1.25 million people. While the crowd cheered Trump and Modi’s bromance in Gujarat, thousands of miles away, anti-government protesters rocked the national capital, new Delhi, angered by the recent citizenship amendment bill which is offensive to Muslim immigrants and the Muslim community as a whole. However, Trump did not comment on the protests or the controversial plans by the Indian government. Instead, he praised Modi for his secularism and freedom of religion. The two sides also managed to agree to a $3 billion defence deal though they failed to agree on a wider trade deal.
To better understand the state of US-India relations, I spoke with Dr. Jivanta Schottli, Assistant Professor in India Politics and Foreign Policy at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. She claimed the recent defence deal is very significant for both strategic and geo-political interests and that the relationship between Trump and Modi extends beyond ‘friendship’ and is more a reflection of ‘solidarity’ between the two largest democracies.
The following is a transcript of our discussion which has been edited for brevity.
What similarities can you point out between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi in terms of their strategies towards their respective immigration and border issues?
Both like to be seen as strong and both seek to be very visible leaders of their country. And they have crafted a style that is very different to the leaders that preceded them, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh – both of whom were often regarded as intellectual, distant and removed from the people.
In terms of their strategies on immigration and borders, it is hard to draw a comparison as the nature of the issues are so very different in both countries.
The Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed last December in India deals with the issue of illegal immigration, defined in a very particular way, by focusing only on non-Muslims who had come to India, fleeing persecution from the three countries of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before December 2014. The bill generated massive protests, that turned violent and resulted in deaths and courted a lot of controversy over the fact that it drew religion into the question of citizenship. This is a highly delicate matter not just because of whether or not it jeopardises the practice of secularism but because it is fundamentally tied up with the historical processes and premises upon which countries in South Asia came into existence. However, it must be pointed out that the bill was passed with majorities in both houses of the Indian parliament and even though appeals have been made to the Supreme Court, it has not been declared unconstitutional.
In this sense it is not really comparable with the controversies surrounding Donald Trump’s restrictions on immigration which have come about largely through executive order (the travel ban, enhancing border security).
There are certainly concerns in India that together with another initiative, the National Register of Citizens (which was introduced through legislation in 2003) this would effectively be a means of rendering people state-less and that Muslims would be targeted. This has already happened in one particular state in India, the north eastern State of Assam. The target, however, was not primarily religion but ethnicity, harnessing local resentments at migrants who have been coming from neighbouring states within India.
Protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in India. Source: The Wire
Trump's policies have been directed at people currently attempting to enter the USA, either through legal means such as visas as well as illegal border crossings. Hence, I think the moral and legal issues at stake are very different.
On policies regarding the border, there may be parallels between India and the US, but the nature of the problem is once again so very different. For India, the borders with all neighbouring countries have been a security issue at one point or another – land borders with Pakistan being the most well-known but the vulnerability of India’s coastline was exposed during the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008.
Under Narendra Modi’s government there have been a number of occasions where firm action has been taken over the issue of borders – for instance, the use of so-called ‘surgical strikes’ in 2016 and again in 2019 when the Indian Air Force crossed the Line of Control to take out camps – this was first in response to the Uri terror attack, the second in response to the Pulwama attack. In 2015 there were also reports that Indian special commandos had crossed into Myanmar in a counter-insurgency operation. So, there have been a number of instances of stronger actions taken on borders but at the same time, there have also been efforts to resolve long-standing border disputes through diplomacy, such as the border with Bangladesh.
To summarise, the border challenges for India are very complex given the sheer number of neighbouring countries, the historical legacies around borders and territory, the issue of cross-border insurgencies and let’s not forget the 4000 km long border with China that is as-yet un-demarcated and which represents a ‘security’ challenge like no other.
Is the $3 billion defence deal a consolation deal for India or is it a reflection of the United States’ long-term strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region?
According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the U.S. State Department, the defence trade between India and the US has increased from near zero in 2008 to $15 billion in 2019. If this is correct, then a $3 billion defence deal is quite significant. I would say two points can be made and used as important indicators of whether or not there is a long-term, convergent strategic interest that has emerged around the concept of the Indo-Pacific (rather than the Asia-Pacific) and which, has been reiterated during the Trump visit, and reinforced by its outcomes:
First, the maritime focus: this is mentioned in the joint statement; it has been a major aspect of recent bilateral activities and was also reinforced in terms of the large focus on acquisitions for the Indian navy in the defence deal. It is also very significant that there are indications of the US moving towards enlarging the geographical definition and remit of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, specifically through enhancing Indo-US military cooperation in the Western Indian Ocean.
Second, the legislative and diplomatic steps that have been taken towards sharing technology, integrating supply chains and promoting efforts at joint manufacturing and co-development. This represents a compromise on both sides: for the US this has required introducing legal definitions and amendments to enable a deepening of the defence relationship with a country that is neither a NATO ally nor a ‘major non-NATO ally’. For India there has been a relaxation on the demands for technology transfer to be a prerequisite and to find ways to fast-track foreign military acquisitions.
I would see both these emerging trends as having a lock-in effect on the relationship.
Is Trump’s ‘America First’ policy and Modi’s ‘Make in India’ initiative detrimental to each other?
There has been much discussion and criticism of the Make in India initiative, that it has fallen far short of expectations. In terms of the dilemmas that may arise from Trump’s America First policy I think it is again going to be a matter of give and take. India will benefit from the trend of companies to diversify their supply chains, something that has already begun, and which is likely to be accelerated in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. American companies will be encouraged to move their manufacturing away from China, and India can be a beneficiary of this. There is also talk of greater collaboration in the pharmaceutical sector. At the same time, India will have to relent on tariffs. So, rather than say that one is going to be detrimental to the other, I would argue that it will depend on how well India negotiates with the US administration.
After Pakistan, is India the new economic ally for the containment of Chinese economic development in the region?
I suppose you mean China’s expanding economic influence in the region of South Asia. This is a big challenge for India, considering the extent to which Chinese investments and economic power has extended across South Asia. Again, I would argue that while it certainly does come down to resources, it is diplomacy that is equally necessary. Countries in South Asia are aware of the risks involved in becoming solely dependent on Chinese funding and combined with the fact that India has geographical and cultural advantages, it can build on its long term cooperation within the region and offer countries a way of off-setting these risks. India’s recent diplomatic outreach with the newly elected Sri Lankan President is a case in point.
Now if we talk about Trump’s re-election campaign, how effective has his India visit been in terms of reaching out to the Indian diaspora in the US?
Certainly, that is mentioned as part of the reasoning behind doing mass events like ‘Howdy Modi’ in Texas and ‘Namaste Trump’ in Gujarat. There are a large number of Gujarati Americans to whom this would have appealed in particular. So yes, there must have been an electoral calculation. Also, the fact that Trump chose only to go to India, and no other country in the region would have appealed further to a sense of pride amongst Indian Americans, as I think it is the first time. And this is an important group of voters in the US, affluent and educated. I believe it is a group that has traditionally voted Democrat but one that has moved towards the Republican party, perhaps due to a growing conservatism that is more in sync with Republican party values as well as a successful business community that favours republican policies.
How much possibility is there for Trump 2.0 not to be trustworthy as a friend with Modi 2.0?
There has always been a large section of Indian intellectuals and policymakers who do not trust the USA. Today, there continue to be naysayers and cynics but also pragmatists who see that improving relations with the USA is a strategic calculation, with benefits and risks. The main goal is not external validation or trust but increasing India’s leverage. Friendship need not, and in fact probably should not, be the ultimate aspiration at the level of international politics. Solidarity yes, global collaboration and endeavours for the sake of humanity but as the current COVID-19 crisis shows, we, as citizens of any country really depend on the state and its ability to raise resources and leverage influence in the international community.
Finally, do you agree with the statement ‘long-term association is a myth in the contemporary global Diplomacy’ and why?
It depends what you mean by long-term association. The Cold War lasted for about 45 years and during that time international politics were framed by alliances and blocs: was that long-term? Many of the Cold War allegiances continue (be it in the form of NATO or even the Non-Aligned Movement!) and yet the rules and frameworks of the post-war order have been modified, challenged, immobilised with all sorts of new groupings and associations emerging. What does that prove? That associations are framed by the structures of power and the institutional framework rather than by ideologies?
And have we ‘progressed’ into a more hyper-connected world with shifting coalitions, allowing for and indeed requiring nimble and pragmatic diplomacy, responding to the issue at hand. India may seem to be very adept at engaging within different coalitions be it in the form of the G-20, the BRICS grouping, within the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) or the Quadrilateral (an informal strategic dialogue amongst Australia, India, Japan, and the United States). So, does that prove that long-term association is a thing of the past?
Perhaps not. First of all, I do think that geography and history, act as twin forces of continuity that fundamentally shape a country’s strategic options and challenges. And so for example, despite the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and the induction of a more global and diverse international order, the Eurasian landmass continues to be a nodal point where the formation of empires and power politics have long determined world politics. And once again, the Eurasian landmass and its maritime routes have moved centre-stage with China’s grand Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI has unleashed dynamics and counter-efforts with ramifications all over the world, including other continents and thus, given India’s geographical location and historical experience, certain long-term associations are likely to continue – as long as there is a regime in China, which, in order to preserve itself, has to expand outwards in terms of influence, markets and security, India will need to pursue a counter-balancing strategy. Thus, the India-China association of competition and rivalry will continue and deepen.
Other associations and whether these will evolve into something more long-term will depend on whether international frameworks of cooperation solidify into and around blocs. In recent times, fluidity and flexibility had characterised international cooperation but it remains to be seen, whether in a COVID-19 world we will see a move towards the consolidation of states and blocs. If this were to happen then India will be faced with a situation that has some similarities to the early years after Independence, in the 1950s: of being too big a country and political power to become a camp-follower and perhaps not quite big enough as an economic power, to play the effective role of a dominant leader.
However, we need to remember that this time round (of power shifts and structural change) India is not emerging out of colonial rule but is a proud 70+ year-old democracy and the world’s 5th largest economy. This will mean that while geography and history present certain recurring challenges, the choices and options for India are very different. I believe, therefore, that we are at an inflection point in global diplomacy where the shape and nature of current associations are going to take on a much greater long-term significance.
Dr. Jivanta Schottli, Assistant Professor in India Politics and Foreign Policy at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University
Sayantan Mondial is a graduate student at UCD Clinton Institute.